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1. Introduction 
Changes in international trade flows and world prices are major channels through which 
the global financial crisis will hit developing countries. The recession in the ‘global 
North’ triggered by the financial crisis and the resulting slowdown of growth in China 
and other major emerging economies will generate declines in demand for exports from 
developing countries, along with a reversal of the beneficial terms-of-trade trends that 
have favoured net exporters of primary commodities over the last few years. How these 
trade shocks and terms-of-trade trends affect economic performance and welfare in low-
income countries depends on country-specific characteristics, especially initial trade 
patterns, and requires a differentiated analysis across countries.  
This study uses a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) world trade model 
to gauge the impact of a slowdown in economic activity in the OECD on trade 
performance, world prices, and aggregate welfare in the rest of the world with a particular 
focus on the least developed countries (LDCs) in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and on 
other DfID focus countries. The results of the simulation analysis indicate the degree of 
vulnerability of different developing countries and regions distinguished in the model to 
impacts arising from the recession via the trade channel. Using these results, one can 
quantify the general order of magnitude of additional external assistance that would be 
required to compensate developing countries for the negative trade shocks emanating 
from the ‘North’. 
In addition to the trade channel, there are important potential impacts that work through 
financial channels such as contractions of trade credit, declines in foreign investment, 
drops in remittances, and changes in foreign debt servicing burdens. This study focuses 
on the trade channel using a model of real trade flows in which financial flows are held 
fixed. While it is possible to use such a real trade model to explore the impact on global 
trade and production of exogenous macro shocks working through financial flows, it is 
useful to analyze the impacts working only through the trade channel to get a sense of 
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how the structure of trade affects the diffusion of the real shocks across the global 
economy.1  
The following section provides a brief outline of the analytical framework and the 
simulation approach adopted in this study, and discusses its scope and limitations. 
Section 3 highlights the main features of pre-crisis trade patterns in the benchmark data 
set that codetermine the direction and magnitude of OECD recession impacts on low-
income countries through the trade channel. Section 4 presents and discusses the main 
simulation results. Section 5 decomposes the effects of an OECD-wide recession into 
impacts due to the slowdown in high-income America, high-income Europe and high-
income Asia respectively and also considers the implications of a stronger growth decline 
in China. Section 6 examines the sensitivity of the main results to alternative factor 
market closures and behavioural parameter settings, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Analytic Framework and Simulation Approach 
2.1 The GLOBE Model 
The analytic framework for the analysis is the GLOBE model, a theory-grounded, 
comparative-static, multi-region, multi-sectoral CGE model of global production and 
trade.2 The model is calibrated to the new GTAP7 database that reflects the global input-
output structure of production and trade by origin and destination in 2004. The database 
distinguishes 113 geographical regions and 57 commodity groups. For the present study, 
we retain the full geographical detail for the individual least developed country (LDC) 
regions and other DfID focus countries identified in the dataset along with a range of 
other developing country (DC) regions and three OECD+ regions.3 As shown in Table 1, 
the model distinguishes 32 regions including 19 DfID focus regions and 9 other DC 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Noland et al. (1998) for an analysis using a global real trade model of the impacts of the 
Asian financial crisis.  
2 For recent applications of this model, see, e.g., McDonald, Thierfelder and Robinson (2008) and 
McDonald and Willenbockel (2008). For detailed technical documentation of the model, see McDonald, 
Thierfelder and Robinson (2007).  
3 OECDAsia and OECDEurope in the model include a number of non-OECD high-income countries – 
hence the label OECD+. 
3 
 
regions. To keep the analysis tractable and allow a compact presentation of results, the 
sectoral aggregation used in this study distinguishes five broad commodity groups and 
activities: food and food products, fuels, other primary products, non-food 
manufacturing, and services. The model includes five primary production factors: skilled 
labour, unskilled labour, capital, land and natural resources. 
International Trade 
Domestically produced commodities are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for traded 
goods. Import demand is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions; imported commodities from different source regions to a destination 
region are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other and are aggregated to form 
composite import commodities that are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for their 
counterpart domestic commodities The composite imported commodities and their 
counterpart domestic commodities are then combined to produce composite consumption 
commodities, which are the commodities demanded by domestic agents as intermediate 
inputs and final demand (private consumption, government, and investment). Export 
supply is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
functions; the composite export commodities are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for 
domestically consumed commodities, while the exported commodities from a source 
region to different destination regions are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each 
other. The composite exported commodities and their counterpart domestic commodities 
are then combined as composite production commodities. The use of nested CET 
functions for export supply implies that domestic producers adjust their export supply 
decisions in response to changes in the relative prices of exports and domestic 
commodities. This specification is desirable in a global model with a mix of developing 
and developed countries that produce different kinds of traded goods with the same 
aggregate commodity classification, and yields more realistic behaviour of international 
prices than models assuming perfect substitution on the export side. 
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Production, Input Demand and Factor Markets 
Production relationships by activities are characterized by nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production functions. Activity output is a CES composite of aggregate 
intermediate inputs and aggregate value added, while aggregate intermediate inputs are a 
Leontief aggregate of the individual intermediate commodity inputs and aggregate value 
added is a CES composite of primary factors demanded by each activity. The 
determination of product supply and input demand is based on the assumption of profit 
maximizing behaviour.  
Factor markets in developed countries are characterized by inelastic factor supplies and 
the model solves for market-clearing factor prices. In developing regions, however, we 
assume that the real wage of skilled and unskilled labour is fixed in terms of the domestic 
consumer price index and that the supply of skilled and unskilled labour is infinitely 
elastic at that wage. In this specification, any shock that would otherwise reduce the 
equilibrium wage will instead lead to increased unemployment.  
While skilled and unskilled labour is mobile across activities, land and natural resources 
are activity-specific under the activity aggregation used in the present study. Given the 
short-run perspective of the present study, physical capital is likewise treated as sector-
specific in the simulations reported below.  
 
Final Domestic Demand by Commodity 
The commodity composition of government consumption demand and investment 
demand is fixed, with demand patterns from the benchmark data set. Households are 
utility maximizers who respond to changes in relative prices and incomes. In this version 
of the model, the utility functions for private households take the Stone-Geary form and 
hence consumer demand by commodity is described by a Linear Expenditure System 
(LES) specification.  
 
Macro Closure 
For this exercise a “neutral” or “balanced” set of macro closure rules is specified. Current 
account balances for all regions are assumed to be fixed at initial benchmark levels in 
terms of the global numeraire and real exchange rates adjust to maintain external 
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equilibrium. Since the model only solves for relative prices, we assume that the consumer 
price index in each country/region is fixed and that a trade-weighted average of the 
exchange rates for the OECD-America countries is also fixed, defining the global 
numeraire for the model. This treatment implies that the regional current account 
balances are fixed in terms of the basket of goods underlying the OECD-America 
consumer price index. Any change in, say, the nominal value of export earnings at world 
market prices in the model can be seen as changes in dollars of constant purchasing 
power in terms of this basket of goods.  
The assumption of fixed current account balances reflects our focus on the trade channel, 
assuming away the effects of the crisis on capital flows. It ensures that there are no 
changes in future “claims” on exports across the regions in the model, i.e., net asset 
positions are fixed. In addition, we assume a “balanced” macro adjustment to the shock 
within countries. Changes in aggregate absorption are assumed to be shared equally (to 
maintain the shares from the base data) among private consumption, government, and 
investment demands.  
 
Benchmark Data and Calibration 
The model is calibrated to a social accounting matrix representation of the GTAP 7.0 
database (Narayanan and Walmsley (eds.), 2008) that combines detailed bilateral trade, 
and protection data reflecting economic linkages among regions with individual country 
input-output data, which account for intersectoral linkages within regions, for the 
benchmark year 2004. Production, trade and income elasticities are drawn from the 
GTAP behavioural data base. Appendix A provides further detail and reports the key 
elasticity figures. 
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Table 1: Regional Disaggregation of the Model 
DfID focus countries in italics 
Code Description Notes on Composite Regions 
Cambodia Cambodia  
Vietnam Vietnam  
Myanmar Myanmar  
Indonesia Indonesia  
Bangladesh Bangladesh  
India India  
Pakistan Pakistan  
China China  
KyrgyzRepub Kyrgyz Republic  
RoSoAsia Rest of South Asia
4
 Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives 
RoAsia Rest of Asia except Middle East 
RoAmericas Rest of the Americas Central and South America, Caribbean 
NorthAfrica North Africa Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia 
Nigeria Nigeria  
Senegal Senegal  
RoWAfrica Rest of Western Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Sierra 
Leone, Togo 
CntrlAfrica Central Africa Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao 
Tome and Principe 
SCntrlAfrica South Central Africa Democratic Republic Congo, Angola 
Ethiopia Ethiopia  
Malawi Malawi  
Mozambique Mozambique  
Tanzania Tanzania  
Uganda Uganda  
Zambia Zambia  
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe  
RoEAfrica Rest of Eastern Africa
5
 Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Djibuti, Eritrea, Somalia, East 
African island states 
SouthAfrica Republic South Africa  
RoSACU Rest of South African Customs Union Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
OECDAsia OECD Asia and Oceania, Other High-
Income Asia 
Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong 
OECDEurope OECD Europe and Other EU includes EU candidate countries inc. Turkey  
OECDAmerica OECD North America Canada, Mexico, USA 
RoW Rest of the World Former Soviet Union, Rest of Eastern Europe, Middle East 
 
                                                 
4 Afghanistan and Nepal jointly account for 91.1% of the region’s 2007 GDP. 
5 Kenya, Rwanda and Sudan jointly account for 85.1 % of the region’s 2007 GDP. 
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2.2 The Simulation Approach 
To generate a recession scenario with a drop in real GDP in the OECD+ region, we 
reduce OECD+ primary factor endowments—reducing employment as well as capital, 
land and natural resource utilisation. As a result, with the fall in income, OECD+ 
commodity demand from all regions of origin will drop, forcing real adjustments in the 
rest of the world. The set-up allows decomposing the total effect into effects due to a 
recession in high-income Europe, North America and high-income Asia. The analysis is 
also extended to include a recession in China (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario Code  Description 
oecdall  5%  real GDP drop in all OECD+ regions  
oecdam  5%  real GDP drop in OECD America 
oecdeu  5%  real GDP drop in OECD Europe  
oecdas  5%  real GDP drop in High‐Income Asia (OECD Asia) 
chin  5%  real GDP drop in China  
oecdchin  5%  real GDP drop in OECD+ and China  
 
The assumption of a 5% drop in real GDP at factor cost in high-income countries is based 
on an inspection of pre-crisis OECD growth trends and recent macroeconomic forecasts 
for 2009 by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD: The five-year average real annual 
OECD GDP growth rate over the period 2004-08 has been on the order of 2.7%. This rate 
may be considered as the medium-run trend growth rate that would have prevailed 
through 2009 in the absence of the financial crisis shock. The end-of-2008 forecasts by 
the IMF World Bank and OECD6 predict an OECD-wide GDP growth rate on the order 
of -0.3% for 2009 - that is, OECD GDP in 2009 is predicted to be 3% below trend GDP. 
However, more recent macroeconomic forecasts including the end-of-January IMF World 
Economic Outlook update are substantially more pessimistic – hence we assume an 
OECD-wide GDP drop of 5% relative to a “no-global-financial-crisis” benchmark. 
 
                                                 
6  See World Bank (2009), IMF (2008), OECD (2008). 
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2.3 Scope and Limitations of the Approach 
The distinct advantage of using a global CGE modelling approach to study the 
transmission of the crisis to developing countries through the trade channel is its unique 
ability to take systematic account of observable differences in the commodity 
composition of exports and imports across countries as well as differences in their 
openness to trade. For a regionally differentiated analysis of economic shocks that affect 
the structure of world market prices in a significant manner, this ability is of crucial 
importance. Impact analyses which do not take account of the commodity and 
geographical patterns of trade by country are bound to generate essentially misleading 
results.  
The approach is based on a coherent theoretical framework with transparent micro-
foundations, which allows explaining simulation results in terms of the responses of 
producers and consumers to changes in their environment. In contrast to partial-analytic 
ad hoc forecasts, the global general equilibrium nature of the analysis avoids fallacies of 
composition and ensures the internal consistency of results.7 
However, it must be borne in mind that comparative-static real-sphere CGE models like 
GLOBE are not built for the analysis of shocks of a monetary macroeconomic nature in 
which volatile expectations play a key role. The financial system in this class of models is 
implicitly assumed to perform its intermediary role to channel savings into productive 
investment in a smooth and neutral fashion without influence on real economic 
fundamentals. In short, the classical dichotomy between the real and monetary sphere of 
the economy is assumed to hold and credit crunches are ruled out.  The equilibrium 
concept is a steady state with stationary expectations.  
One important implication of the absence of expectations-driven macro-dynamics in the 
model is its inability to replicate the orders of magnitude for the observed declines in oil 
prices and other primary raw materials since the onset of the crisis (see Figure 1). To the 
extent that these storable commodities have been subject to speculative investment, their 
                                                 
7 As a case in point, a recent IMF Report (IMF, 2009) presents partial-analytic simulation results of global 
financial crisis impacts on low-income countries (LICs). In these simulations, all LICs experience large 
increases in trade balance and current account deficits. It remains unclear, however, which other countries 
precisely are meant to generate the corresponding enormous additional trade balance and current account 
surpluses implied by this analysis. 
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prices share the characteristics of asset prices, which tend initially to over- or undershoot 
their new long-run equilibria in response to positive or negative shocks in the presence of 
forward-looking expectations or in response to news that change market expectations of 
future shocks.8 Besides such short-run undershooting effects, the model with its 2004 
benchmark data base also does not capture the speculative bubble elements in the 2008 
pre-crisis oil price hike.9 Thus, the simulation compare equilibrium positions in the 
absence of pure speculative bubbles (that arguably would have burst anyway) and after 
initial undershooting effects have run their course. 
Moreover, the analytical framework precludes deflationary downward spirals in which 
negative expectations feed upon themselves and savings are hoarded rather than re-
invested.  
The comparative-static equilibrium nature of the analysis implies that the simulation 
results presented below are not meant to provide precise point predictions for a specific 
date. To reiterate, the usefulness of the approach lies in its ability to provide 
geographically differentiated insights about the transmission of the OECD recession to 
developing countries through the channel of international trade, and thus to identify  
country characteristics that determine the degree of exposure to the crisis shock  due to 
trade links in isolation from other potential crisis impacts. While the emerging global 
financial crisis literature is already replete with generic pronouncements about trade 
impacts on “the” developing countries and with anecdotal evidence for individual 
countries, this is – to the best of our knowledge – the first systematic study that provides 
such geographically differentiated information. 
Recent global macroeconometric growth forecasts have turned out to be highly unreliable 
and the quantitative simulation results presented in this study are likewise subject to 
uncertainty. However, the main qualitative insights from the analysis are independent of 
the exact scale of the crisis shock. 
 
                                                 
8 Asset price overshooting is a common phenomenon in macroeconomic models with forward-looking 
expectations. A celebrated early example is the well-known Dornbusch overshooting model. 
9 Nevertheless, as shown below, the model indeed generates substantial price reductions for fuels and other 
primary commodities relative to other goods, yet the main reason is that the spot demand for these 
commodities is to a large extent price-inelastic (but income-elastic) intermediate input demand, and hence 
relatively large price drops are required to re-establish equilibrium after the recession shock. 
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Figure1: World Market Commodity Price Developments 
 
2004-2008: Annual average Price indices relative to OECD America CPI (2004=100).  
Source: Own calculations based on IMF Primary Commodity Prices, March 5, 2009 and OECD CPI statistics.  
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3. Pre­Crisis Regional Trade Patterns 
Tables 3 to 5 show features of 2004 trade patterns for the 28 developing countries and 
regions in the benchmark data set. Here we highlight features that are crucial for the 
interpretation of the simulation results presented in section 4. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the shares of individual country/region in total exports 
of goods and services of developing countries to all destinations.10 China alone accounts 
for 35 percent of the total, while sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than 10 percent of 
total DC exports. The remaining columns of Table 3 show the commodity composition of 
exports by region. While the Asian DCs predominantly export manufactures, the exports 
of a subset of African regions including North Africa, Nigeria, Central and South Central 
Africa, and Uganda are strongly dominated by fuels. 
Table 4 shows the shares of DC exports to OECD+ regions in total DC exports by 
country. On average, nearly three-quarters of DC exports go to high-income countries. 
Table 5 exhibits net exports – i.e. the difference between exports and imports - by country 
and commodity group. The signs and magnitudes of these figures determine the   
direction of aggregate net welfare effects associated with relative price changes due to the 
crisis shock. The importance of exports in aggregate economic activity as measured by 
the ratio of exports to GDP is shown in Table 6 along with information on the economic 
and demographic size by developing region.  
                                                 
10 Note that for aggregate regions, the figures include intra-region trade. 
12 
 
 Table 3:  Commodity Composition of Developing Country Exports - 2004 
Percentage commodity shares in total exports of goods and services by region 2004 
  
Share in DC 
Exports  AgFood  Fuels  OPrimary  NfManuf  Services 
 Main 
Export 
Cambodia  0.2  3.1 1.6 0.1 79.2 16.0  m
Vietnam  1.7  17.8 11.3 0.3 59.6 10.9  m
Myanmar  0.1  19.5 28.1 12.6 31.9 7.9  m
Indonesia  4.4  11.4 16.2 2.6 62.5 7.2  m
Bangladesh  0.5  5.7 0.0 0.1 83.0 11.1  m
India  5.3  8.9 3.6 1.8 63.3 22.4  m
Pakistan  0.8  9.8 1.0 0.3 70.3 18.6  m
China  35.2  3.6 1.9 0.4 85.7 8.5  m
KyrgyzRepub  0.1  14.3 0.4 0.4 47.1 37.8  m
RoSoAsia  0.1  11.5 11.7 1.2 31.4 44.3  s
RoAsia  18.4  8.4 4.5 0.8 71.8 14.5  m
RoAmericas  18.3  21.9 15.7 4.5 41.0 16.8  m
NorthAfrica  5.2  5.8 42.3 1.1 24.7 26.1  f
Nigeria  1.9  1.5 86.8 0.2 2.6 8.9  f
Senegal  0.1  28.6 1.5 2.4 31.9 35.5  s
RoWAfrica  1.0  38.1 9.9 8.1 28.7 15.1  a
CntrlAfrica  0.7  7.1 55.0 10.7 11.5 15.6  f
SCntrlAfrica  0.7  0.9 86.0 4.1 2.4 6.6  f
Ethiopia  0.1  31.8 0.0 2.1 12.5 53.6  s
Malawi  0.0  57.2 23.1 0.1 13.5 6.0  a
Mozambique  0.1  14.6 0.1 0.7 54.1 30.4  m
Tanzania  0.1  37.3 0.0 6.8 19.6 36.2  a
Uganda  0.1  33.9 38.5 0.4 10.9 16.3  f
Zambia  0.1  16.8 0.0 3.5 71.7 7.9  m
Zimbabwe  0.1  36.5 0.3 13.3 39.9 9.9  a
RoEAfrica  0.9  25.3 17.7 1.5 29.2 26.2  m
SouthAfrica  3.2  10.3 7.4 7.6 61.3 13.4  m
RoSACU  0.6  13.5 3.2 32.3 37.8 13.2  m
Total  100  9.8 10.7 2.0 64.0 13.5  m
Last column: m: NfManuf; f: Fuels; s: Services; a: AgFood 
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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Table 4:  DC Exports to OECD+ as Share of all Exports by Region - 2004 
Percentage Shares 
  
Share in DC 
Exports  OECD+ Shares  Main 
   to All  to OECD+ 
OECD+ 
All 
OECD 
America 
OECD 
Asia 
OECD 
Europe  Destination 
Cambodia  0.2  0.3  90.7 50.1 7.9 32.7 OECDAmerica
Vietnam  1.7  1.7  75.8 21.3 26.5 28.0 OECDEurope
Myanmar  0.1  0.1  38.4 2.4 12.3 23.6 OECDEurope
Indonesia  4.4  4.3  70.9 15.2 37.6 18.1 OECDAsia
Bangladesh  0.5  0.7  91.4 31.1 4.4 55.9 OECDEurope
India  5.3  4.4  61.4 19.4 10.6 31.4 OECDEurope
Pakistan  0.8  0.8  68.3 26.3 7.9 34.1 OECDEurope
China  35.2  39.2  81.9 29.9 26.3 25.7 OECDAmerica
KyrgyzRepub  0.1  0.0  31.0 4.7 2.6 23.6 OECDEurope
RoSoAsia  0.1  0.1  65.1 19.9 8.2 36.9 OECDEurope
RoAsia  18.4  17.1  68.4 19.2 28.5 20.7 OECDAsia
RoAmericas  18.3  16.8  67.3 32.8 8.0 26.5 OECDAmerica
NorthAfrica  5.2  5.9  83.9 16.1 4.6 63.2 OECDEurope
Nigeria  1.9  1.7  65.1 37.3 6.4 21.4 OECDAmerica
Senegal  0.1  0.1  53.5 8.1 6.2 39.2 OECDEurope
RoWAfrica  1.0  0.9  68.0 11.9 5.9 50.2 OECDEurope
CntrlAfrica  0.7  0.8  79.9 31.8 11.5 36.7 OECDEurope
SCntrlAfrica  0.7  0.5  54.4 35.2 7.9 11.3 OECDAmerica
Ethiopia  0.1  0.1  70.6 18.5 11.3 40.8 OECDEurope
Malawi  0.0  0.0  64.9 19.1 8.6 37.1 OECDEurope
Mozambique  0.1  0.1  72.8 3.9 3.1 65.9 OECDEurope
Tanzania  0.1  0.1  57.0 10.8 10.3 35.9 OECDEurope
Uganda  0.1  0.1  70.3 15.4 12.8 42.1 OECDEurope
Zambia  0.1  0.1  43.4 2.3 18.0 23.0 OECDEurope
Zimbabwe  0.1  0.1  50.9 6.4 10.0 34.5 OECDEurope
RoEAfrica  0.9  0.8  66.3 14.7 14.5 37.1 OECDEurope
SouthAfrica  3.2  2.8  64.2 11.0 14.9 38.3 OECDEurope
RoSACU  0.6  0.5  66.1 15.0 5.3 45.9 OECDEurope
Total  100  100  73.4 25.4 20.0 28.0 OECDEurope
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
14 
 
 
Table 5: DC Net Exports by Commodity Group – 2004 
in bill US$ 2004 
   AgFood  Fuels  OPrimary  NfManuf  Services
Cambodia  ‐0.32  ‐0.03 0.00 0.55 0.37
Vietnam  2.36  1.26 ‐0.16 ‐10.86 ‐0.72
Myanmar  0.10  0.40 0.46 ‐1.34 ‐0.03
Indonesia  3.19  3.96 1.59 7.83 ‐9.37
Bangladesh  ‐2.46  ‐1.43 ‐0.12 ‐0.97 0.33
India  0.95  ‐29.19 ‐5.79 ‐8.88 3.02
Pakistan  ‐1.68  ‐4.24 ‐0.13 ‐5.28 ‐2.90
China  ‐3.91  ‐31.70 ‐16.87 104.36 ‐0.85
KyrgyzRepub  ‐0.01  ‐0.27 ‐0.01 ‐0.61 0.23
RoSoAsia  ‐0.69  ‐0.32 0.00 ‐3.08 0.57
RoAsia  5.89  ‐8.37 0.39 40.73 13.20
RoAmericas  52.68  22.70 16.63 ‐63.20 7.15
NorthAfrica  ‐9.53  36.71 ‐0.04 ‐43.49 13.15
Nigeria  ‐2.59  29.23 0.05 ‐13.14 ‐1.45
Senegal  ‐0.55  ‐0.49 ‐0.03 ‐1.38 0.23
RoWAfrica  1.65  0.07 1.45 ‐14.55 ‐0.63
CntrlAfrica  ‐0.55  7.42 1.57 ‐3.69 ‐1.13
SCntrlAfrica  ‐1.72  11.55 0.47 ‐6.79 ‐3.80
Ethiopia  0.20  ‐0.49 0.03 ‐2.31 0.24
Malawi  0.21  0.12 ‐0.01 ‐0.71 ‐0.07
Mozambique  ‐0.28  ‐0.21 0.04 ‐0.10 0.16
Tanzania  0.33  ‐0.33 0.19 ‐2.15 0.19
Uganda  0.34  0.52 ‐0.01 ‐1.07 ‐0.10
Zambia  0.19  ‐0.19 0.04 0.02 ‐0.15
Zimbabwe  0.48  ‐0.19 0.28 ‐0.74 ‐0.08
RoEAfrica  0.15  2.88 0.11 ‐11.76 1.40
SouthAfrica  2.46  ‐2.07 4.18 ‐3.96 1.60
RoSACU  0.13  ‐0.25 3.45 ‐1.79 ‐0.02
Total  9.8  10.7 2.0 64.0 13.5
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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Table 6: Selected Other Macro Indicators by Developing Region - 2004 
   GDP (mp)  Population  GDP p.c.  Exports/  Net Exports 
   US$ mill  mill  US$  GDP  US$ mill 
Cambodia  4,443  13.8  322  0.95  580 
Vietnam  38,895  83.1  468  0.84  ‐8,115 
Myanmar  7,592  50.0  152  0.39  ‐416 
Indonesia  251,298  220.1  1142  0.35  7,195 
Bangladesh  53,688  139.2  386  0.20  ‐4,645 
India  624,480  1087.1  574  0.17  ‐39,878 
Pakistan  91,073  154.8  588  0.18  ‐14,242 
China  1,630,257  1308.0  1246  0.42  51,024 
KyrgyzRepub  2,088  5.2  402  0.53  ‐667 
RoSoAsia  13,083  56.3  232  0.22  ‐3,527 
RoAsia  1,662,659  384.3  4326  0.75  176,631 
RoAmericas  1,456,045  447.7  3252  0.25  35,957 
NorthAfrica  254,183  151.8  1675  0.40  ‐3,203 
Nigeria  64,819  128.7  504  0.57  12,109 
Senegal  6,902  11.4  606  0.26  ‐2,227 
RoWAfrica  47,993  117.4  409  0.39  ‐12,008 
CntrlAfrica  37,063  35.4  1048  0.38  3,623 
SCntrlAfrica  23,248  71.3  326  0.58  ‐293 
Ethiopia  6,964  75.6  92  0.25  ‐2,318 
Malawi  1,704  12.6  135  0.43  ‐460 
Mozambique  5,902  19.4  304  0.36  ‐382 
Tanzania  11,145  37.6  296  0.22  ‐1,779 
Uganda  7,177  27.8  258  0.26  ‐318 
Zambia  5,261  11.5  458  0.40  ‐86 
Zimbabwe  3,796  12.9  293  0.61  ‐257 
RoEAfrica  57,581  119.1  484  0.30  ‐7,216 
SouthAfrica  210,388  47.2  4456  0.29  2,206 
RoSACU  17,600  6.6  2663  0.62  1,524 
Total  6,597,329  4,836  1364  0.43  188,814 
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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4. Impact of an OECD­Wide Recession 
This section presents the main simulation results for the “oecdall” crisis scenario, while 
section 5 summarizes results for the other scenarios listed in Table 2. 
The downturn in high-income regions reduces OECD+ final demand and intermediate 
input demand for goods and services from all regions and entails a terms of trade 
deterioration for all other countries vis-à-vis the OECD+ bloc. Due to the slowdown of 
economic activity, the average world market price of fuels drops markedly relative to 
other goods and services, and the world market price of other primary commodities also 
falls relative to agricultural goods and processed food, manufactures and traded 
services.11 
 
Figure 2: Change in US$ Value of Export Earnings by Developing Country 
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11 Relative to the OECD America consumer price index basket, which serves as the numeraire of the model, 
average world market fuel prices drop by 6.2%, and world market prices of other primary goods drop by 
2.8 % in the simulations. As the model is benchmarked to a 2004 data base and does not capture the 
speculative bubble elements in the 2008 pre-crisis oil price hike, the simulations certainly underestimate the 
actual oil price reductions in relation to 2008 peak levels. 
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The value of world trade falls by around 5.6 percent. Figures 2 and 3 show the effects on 
foreign exchange revenue from exports of goods and services and the terms of trade (i.e. 
the relative price of aggregate exports to aggregate imports) for the 28 DC regions in the 
model. Table 7 shows in addition the changes in real export and import volumes. 
Figure 4 exhibits the implications for aggregate welfare by DC region as measured by the 
percentage change in real final absorption (i.e. the sum of real private consumption, real 
government consumption and real investment).12 
 
Figure 3: Terms of Trade Effect by Developing Country  
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Simulation: oecdall 
 
The four regions suffering the strongest drop in export earnings, the strongest terms of 
trade deterioration, and the most severe reduction in aggregate welfare are Nigeria, South 
Central Africa (Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo), Central Africa and North 
Africa. Leaving apart their location on the same continent, the common features of these 
                                                 
12 The changes in real absorption are closely correlated with the proper Hicksian measures of consumer 
welfare change in this model, e.g. the correlation coefficient between real absorption change and the 
equivalent variation in percent of benchmark consumption by country is 0.9946. 
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regions are their status as net fuel exporters in combination with very high shares of fuel 
exports in total export revenue – ranging from 87% for Nigeria and 86% for South 
Central Africa13 to 42% for North Africa. Within this “top-four” group of worst-hit 
regions, the terms of trade deterioration translates into a substantially more pronounced 
welfare loss for Nigeria and South Central Africa compared to North Africa and Central 
Africa, because the former two regions feature significantly higher export/GDP ratios 
(nearly 60%) than the latter (around 40%) and are therefore more vulnerable to the 
adverse external shock. For the same reason, a number of regions with low export/GDP 
ratios including Uganda and the Rest of East Africa show relatively moderate aggregate 
welfare losses despite a strong negative terms of trade effect, while for countries with a 
high degree of openness – e.g. Cambodia and Vietnam – relatively mild terms of trade 
losses entail considerable aggregate welfare losses. 
 
Figure 4: Change in Real Absorption by Country 
 
                                                 
13 This figure is largely due to the oil exports of Angola while DR Congo is not a major fuel exporter. 
Within the Central Africa region, mineral fuels are the dominant source of export revenue for Cameroon, 
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, but not for the Central African Republic and Sao Tome and 
Principe. 
19 
 
 
The 8 DC countries that suffer terms-of-trade losses in excess of 2 percent all belong to 
the 12 net fuel exporters among the 28 DC regions according to Table 6. The two 
countries with the lowest terms of trade losses at the bottom of Figure 3 – the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Zimbabwe14 – are not only net fuel importers, but are also characterized by 
OECD shares in total exports that are well below the average for developing countries as 
a whole. 
The three countries with the lowest real absorption loss in Figure 4 – India, Pakistan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic – are net importers of fuels and other primaries and have a high 
share of manufactures and services in total exports. India and Pakistan also have the 
lowest export/GDP ratios of all developing regions in the model while the Kyrgyz 
Republic features the lowest OECD share in total exports of all model regions.15  
 
Expressed in terms of absolute numbers, the simulated drop in the foreign currency value 
of export revenue for all DC regions amounts to around 71 billion US$. The real 
absorption loss in 2004 prices amounts to 47 billion US$ for low-income Asia, 25 billion 
US$ for Africa and 17 billion US$ for Latin America and the Caribbean.16 A rough 
calculation of the aggregate welfare loss across least developed countries amounts to 
about 9 billion US$ (which is 2.3% of LDC GDP). The transmission of the shock from 
the OECD+ countries to these poor countries is relatively weak, half as large as the initial 
shock, which largely reflects the fact that this country group plays only a minor role in 
global trade.  
 
Table 8 expresses the main simulation results in the form of elasticities with respect to a 
change in OECD+ real income; the figures show the effect of a one-percentage-point drop 
in OECD+ real GDP. While computed for a 5% OECD+ GDP shock, these figures 
                                                 
14 Of course, the results for Zimbabwe assume a hypothetical state of the world as of 2004, in which the 
economy had not been wrecked by hyperinflation.  
15 Moreover, both countries have sizable trade balance deficits in the status quo ante, which are kept frozen 
in terms of the numeraire in the simulations to avoid “free lunch” effects. As world market prices of all 
goods and services drop relative to the numeraire, the given deficits buy larger import quantities after the 
shock. 
16 For this calculation, the simulated figures that refer to a 2004 base have been scaled up using country-
specific 2005-2008 real growth rates drawn from USDA-ERS (2009). 
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indicate the magnitude of the effects under alternative assumptions about the depth of the 
recession in high-income countries. The country-specific results show a lot of variation 
across the world and even within the group of least developed countries. The variation 
depends mostly on their exposure to world markets for primary exports and major 
imports, especially oil.  
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Table 7: Impact of OECD+ Recession on DC Real Macro Aggregates 
Percentage Changes 
   Absorption Imports Exports Exports Terms of GDP 
   real Volume Volume Value Trade real 
Cambodia ‐2.98  ‐1.91  0.17  ‐2.50  ‐1.31  ‐0.84 
Vietnam ‐2.49  ‐2.66  ‐1.71  ‐4.66  ‐1.50  ‐1.69 
Myanmar ‐0.89  ‐1.62  0.23  ‐3.86  ‐2.18  ‐0.22 
Indonesia ‐1.78  ‐2.91  ‐0.32  ‐3.84  ‐2.11  ‐0.90 
Bangladesh ‐0.52  ‐1.02  ‐0.62  ‐3.09  ‐1.06  ‐0.40 
India ‐0.15  ‐1.10  ‐0.13  ‐3.12  ‐1.61  0.06 
Pakistan ‐0.31  ‐1.07  ‐1.15  ‐3.63  ‐1.42  ‐0.21 
China ‐1.84  ‐2.88  ‐0.71  ‐3.25  ‐1.69  ‐0.94 
KyrgyzRepub ‐0.33  ‐0.73  ‐1.36  ‐4.30  ‐0.79  ‐0.55 
RoSoAsia ‐0.36  ‐0.59  ‐0.90  ‐3.81  ‐1.59  ‐0.36 
RoAsia ‐3.43  ‐2.89  ‐0.96  ‐3.44  ‐1.14  ‐1.73 
RoAmericas ‐1.95  ‐3.17  ‐0.73  ‐3.89  ‐1.76  ‐1.37 
NorthAfrica ‐3.20  ‐4.09  ‐1.03  ‐5.30  ‐2.55  ‐1.98 
Nigeria ‐4.81  ‐6.24  0.14  ‐5.84  ‐2.21  ‐1.33 
Senegal ‐0.93  ‐1.09  ‐2.00  ‐4.01  ‐1.23  ‐1.11 
RoWAfrica ‐1.70  ‐2.18  ‐1.96  ‐4.59  ‐1.80  ‐1.45 
CntrlAfrica ‐3.37  ‐5.53  ‐0.07  ‐5.56  ‐2.84  ‐1.54 
SCntrlAfrica ‐4.28  ‐4.72  ‐0.74  ‐6.65  ‐3.88  ‐2.00 
Ethiopia ‐0.67  ‐1.01  ‐1.55  ‐3.99  ‐1.68  ‐0.69 
Malawi ‐1.18  ‐1.39  ‐1.09  ‐4.33  ‐1.79  ‐0.99 
Mozambique ‐1.11  ‐1.60  ‐1.06  ‐3.54  ‐0.90  ‐0.89 
Tanzania ‐0.67  ‐1.12  ‐1.08  ‐3.69  ‐1.48  ‐0.59 
Uganda ‐1.31  ‐2.31  ‐0.30  ‐4.67  ‐2.54  ‐0.74 
Zambia ‐0.95  ‐1.31  ‐0.37  ‐2.94  ‐0.91  ‐0.64 
Zimbabwe ‐1.44  ‐1.52  ‐0.84  ‐3.60  ‐0.67  ‐1.03 
RoEAfrica ‐1.52  ‐2.15  ‐1.04  ‐4.59  ‐2.09  ‐1.15 
SouthAfrica ‐2.28  ‐3.12  ‐1.41  ‐4.37  ‐1.32  ‐1.80 
RoSACU ‐2.93  ‐2.69  ‐0.92  ‐4.43  ‐0.99  ‐1.79 
OECDAsia ‐4.88  ‐4.08  ‐4.65  ‐5.46  1.52  ‐5.00 
OECDAmerica ‐4.68  ‐3.49  ‐5.65  ‐6.34  0.52  ‐5.01 
OECDEurope ‐4.78  ‐4.39  ‐4.95  ‐6.02  0.53  ‐5.00 
RoW ‐3.39  ‐4.02  ‐0.10  ‐5.13  ‐2.85  ‐1.71 
Simulation: oecdall 
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Table 8: Elasticities of DC Macro Aggregates with Respect to a 1%-Point Reduction 
in OECD+ Real GDP 
 
   Absorption Imports Exports Exports Terms of GDP 
   real Volume Volume Value Trade real 
Cambodia ‐0.60  ‐0.38  0.03  ‐0.50  ‐0.26  ‐0.17 
Vietnam ‐0.50  ‐0.53  ‐0.34  ‐0.93  ‐0.30  ‐0.34 
Myanmar ‐0.18  ‐0.32  0.05  ‐0.77  ‐0.44  ‐0.04 
Indonesia ‐0.36  ‐0.58  ‐0.06  ‐0.77  ‐0.42  ‐0.18 
Bangladesh ‐0.10  ‐0.20  ‐0.12  ‐0.62  ‐0.21  ‐0.08 
India ‐0.03  ‐0.22  ‐0.03  ‐0.62  ‐0.32  0.01 
Pakistan ‐0.06  ‐0.21  ‐0.23  ‐0.73  ‐0.28  ‐0.04 
China ‐0.37  ‐0.58  ‐0.14  ‐0.65  ‐0.34  ‐0.19 
KyrgyzRepub ‐0.07  ‐0.15  ‐0.27  ‐0.86  ‐0.16  ‐0.11 
RoSoAsia ‐0.07  ‐0.12  ‐0.18  ‐0.76  ‐0.32  ‐0.07 
RoAsia ‐0.69  ‐0.58  ‐0.19  ‐0.69  ‐0.23  ‐0.35 
RoAmericas ‐0.39  ‐0.63  ‐0.15  ‐0.78  ‐0.35  ‐0.27 
NorthAfrica ‐0.64  ‐0.82  ‐0.21  ‐1.06  ‐0.51  ‐0.40 
Nigeria ‐0.96  ‐1.25  0.03  ‐1.17  ‐0.44  ‐0.27 
Senegal ‐0.19  ‐0.22  ‐0.40  ‐0.80  ‐0.25  ‐0.22 
RoWAfrica ‐0.34  ‐0.44  ‐0.39  ‐0.92  ‐0.36  ‐0.29 
CntrlAfrica ‐0.67  ‐1.11  ‐0.01  ‐1.11  ‐0.57  ‐0.31 
SCntrlAfrica ‐0.86  ‐0.94  ‐0.15  ‐1.33  ‐0.78  ‐0.40 
Ethiopia ‐0.13  ‐0.20  ‐0.31  ‐0.80  ‐0.34  ‐0.14 
Malawi ‐0.24  ‐0.28  ‐0.22  ‐0.87  ‐0.36  ‐0.20 
Mozambique ‐0.22  ‐0.32  ‐0.21  ‐0.71  ‐0.18  ‐0.18 
Tanzania ‐0.13  ‐0.22  ‐0.22  ‐0.74  ‐0.30  ‐0.12 
Uganda ‐0.26  ‐0.46  ‐0.06  ‐0.93  ‐0.51  ‐0.15 
Zambia ‐0.19  ‐0.26  ‐0.07  ‐0.59  ‐0.18  ‐0.13 
Zimbabwe ‐0.29  ‐0.30  ‐0.17  ‐0.72  ‐0.13  ‐0.21 
RoEAfrica ‐0.30  ‐0.43  ‐0.21  ‐0.92  ‐0.42  ‐0.23 
SouthAfrica ‐0.46  ‐0.62  ‐0.28  ‐0.87  ‐0.26  ‐0.36 
RoSACU ‐0.59  ‐0.54  ‐0.18  ‐0.89  ‐0.20  ‐0.36 
Simulation: oecdall 
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5. Decomposition of OECD Shocks by Origin and the Impact 
of a Growth Slowdown in China 
Tables 9 and 10 show the real absorption and export revenue effects for all simulation 
runs listed in Table 2 above. The oecdam, oecdeu and oecdas scenarios decompose the 
total impact of the OECD+ recession (oecdall) discussed in section 4 into the partial 
effects due to a slowdown of economic activity in high-income America, high-income 
Europe and high-income Asia respectively. Generally, the pattern of welfare losses in 
Table 9 matches closely with the distribution of export destination shares by OECD 
region in Table 4: The DC regions suffer most from a recession within the economy of 
their main OECD export destination.  
 
An interesting exception is China whose main export destination is high-income America 
but which is hit hardest by the recession in high-income Asia. The reason is that high-
income Asia is China’s dominant OECD+ trade partner on the import side with an import 
share of 51% in total imports of goods and services and a share of 60% in manufacturing 
imports. China is linked to East and Southeast Asia through value chains. It is a major 
importer of semi-finished manufactures for final assembly and exporter to the rest of the 
world in regional East and Southeast Asian production networks.17 The OECD Asia 
recession entails a deterioration of China’s real exchange rate and thus raises the prices of 
these intermediate inputs for China. 
 
The chin scenario in Tables 9 and 10 simulates the effects of a 5% growth slowdown in 
China. As shown in Figure 5, which ranks the real absorption impacts on other DC 
regions in Table 9 by size, the welfare consequences for other countries remain moderate 
compared to the OECD recession impacts. Only for three regions – the Kyrgyz Republic, 
South Central Africa and Vietnam – does this shock add more than 0.2 percentage points 
to the welfare loss. However, it should be noted that the benchmark data set does not 
reflect the strong growth in China’s trade with a range of other developing countries, 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Ng and Yeats (2003), Athukorala and Yamashita (2006). 
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including countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, over the last few years, and 
thus the simulation results are again likely to underestimate the magnitude of the trade 
and welfare effects. 
 
Table 9: Impacts on Real Absorption by DC Region 
Percentage Changes 
ABSORPTION 
oecdall oecdam oecdeu oecdas chin oecdchin
Cambodia ‐2.98  ‐0.86  ‐0.86  ‐1.25  ‐0.39  ‐3.31
Vietnam ‐2.49  0.06  ‐0.84  ‐1.72  ‐0.49  ‐2.87
Myanmar ‐0.89  0.11  ‐0.31  ‐0.68  ‐0.52  ‐1.32
Indonesia ‐1.78  ‐0.22  ‐0.52  ‐1.03  ‐0.20  ‐1.95
Bangladesh ‐0.52  0.07  ‐0.31  ‐0.27  ‐0.13  ‐0.63
India ‐0.15  0.11  ‐0.32  0.06  ‐0.03  ‐0.19
Pakistan ‐0.31  0.11  ‐0.34  ‐0.07  ‐0.04  ‐0.36
China ‐1.84  ‐0.27  ‐0.38  ‐1.17  ‐3.96  ‐5.02
KyrgyzRepub ‐0.33  0.38  ‐0.65  ‐0.04  ‐0.98  ‐1.11
RoSoAsia ‐0.36  0.31  ‐0.52  ‐0.13  ‐0.01  ‐0.38
RoAsia ‐3.43  ‐0.81  ‐0.84  ‐1.77  ‐0.43  ‐3.80
RoAmericas ‐1.95  ‐0.84  ‐0.83  ‐0.26  ‐0.11  ‐2.04
NorthAfrica ‐3.20  ‐0.57  ‐2.22  ‐0.41  ‐0.13  ‐3.30
Nigeria ‐4.81  ‐1.70  ‐2.07  ‐1.02  ‐0.31  ‐5.01
Senegal ‐0.93  0.52  ‐1.41  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.95
RoWAfrica ‐1.70  0.16  ‐1.39  ‐0.45  ‐0.17  ‐1.83
CntrlAfrica ‐3.37  ‐0.92  ‐1.94  ‐0.51  ‐0.22  ‐3.52
SCntrlAfrica ‐4.28  ‐0.96  ‐1.95  ‐1.39  ‐0.58  ‐4.62
Ethiopia ‐0.67  0.13  ‐0.72  ‐0.06  ‐0.10  ‐0.77
Malawi ‐1.18  0.14  ‐0.95  ‐0.36  ‐0.03  ‐1.21
Mozambique ‐1.11  ‐0.08  ‐0.96  ‐0.05  ‐0.10  ‐1.20
Tanzania ‐0.67  0.08  ‐0.59  ‐0.14  ‐0.11  ‐0.76
Uganda ‐1.31  ‐0.18  ‐0.80  ‐0.33  ‐0.09  ‐1.38
Zambia ‐0.95  ‐0.13  ‐0.63  ‐0.15  ‐0.10  ‐1.04
Zimbabwe ‐1.44  ‐0.17  ‐0.96  ‐0.27  ‐0.07  ‐1.49
RoEAfrica ‐1.52  ‐0.09  ‐1.08  ‐0.34  ‐0.20  ‐1.68
SouthAfrica ‐2.28  ‐0.24  ‐1.63  ‐0.37  ‐0.09  ‐2.37
RoSACU ‐2.93  ‐0.42  ‐2.28  ‐0.18  ‐0.04  ‐2.97
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Table 10: Impacts on Foreign Currency Value of Exports by DC Region 
Percentage Changes 
VALUE OF EXPORTS 
oecdall oecdam oecdeu oecdas chin oecdchin
Cambodia ‐2.50  ‐1.97  ‐0.33  ‐0.19  ‐0.01  ‐2.52
Vietnam ‐4.66  ‐2.47  ‐0.86  ‐1.33  ‐0.37  ‐4.94
Myanmar ‐3.86  ‐2.38  ‐0.67  ‐0.77  ‐0.41  ‐4.20
Indonesia ‐3.84  ‐2.27  ‐0.50  ‐1.06  ‐0.28  ‐4.08
Bangladesh ‐3.09  ‐2.51  ‐0.59  0.02  0.07  ‐3.04
India ‐3.12  ‐2.44  ‐0.52  ‐0.14  ‐0.22  ‐3.30
Pakistan ‐3.63  ‐2.88  ‐0.63  ‐0.12  ‐0.06  ‐3.68
China ‐3.25  ‐2.24  ‐0.26  ‐0.73  ‐3.28  ‐5.77
KyrgyzRepub ‐4.30  ‐2.85  ‐1.00  ‐0.43  ‐0.97  ‐5.05
RoSoAsia ‐3.81  ‐2.67  ‐0.89  ‐0.26  ‐0.13  ‐3.91
RoAsia ‐3.44  ‐2.18  ‐0.39  ‐0.84  ‐0.40  ‐3.79
RoAmericas ‐3.89  ‐2.68  ‐0.79  ‐0.39  ‐0.15  ‐3.99
NorthAfrica ‐5.30  ‐2.74  ‐1.92  ‐0.60  ‐0.19  ‐5.43
Nigeria ‐5.84  ‐3.13  ‐1.51  ‐1.09  ‐0.25  ‐6.00
Senegal ‐4.01  ‐2.41  ‐1.49  ‐0.14  ‐0.03  ‐4.03
RoWAfrica ‐4.59  ‐2.56  ‐1.56  ‐0.47  ‐0.12  ‐4.66
CntrlAfrica ‐5.56  ‐2.88  ‐1.67  ‐0.93  ‐0.43  ‐5.84
SCntrlAfrica ‐6.65  ‐3.43  ‐1.60  ‐1.59  ‐1.11  ‐7.33
Ethiopia ‐3.99  ‐2.84  ‐0.86  ‐0.29  ‐0.25  ‐4.18
Malawi ‐4.33  ‐2.65  ‐1.04  ‐0.63  ‐0.14  ‐4.41
Mozambique ‐3.54  ‐2.36  ‐1.16  0.01  ‐0.11  ‐3.62
Tanzania ‐3.69  ‐2.56  ‐0.74  ‐0.37  ‐0.26  ‐3.89
Uganda ‐4.67  ‐2.73  ‐1.08  ‐0.81  ‐0.23  ‐4.81
Zambia ‐2.94  ‐2.27  ‐0.39  ‐0.25  ‐0.19  ‐3.11
Zimbabwe ‐3.60  ‐2.32  ‐0.86  ‐0.39  ‐0.04  ‐3.61
RoEAfrica ‐4.59  ‐2.68  ‐1.13  ‐0.77  ‐0.36  ‐4.82
SouthAfrica ‐4.37  ‐2.32  ‐1.55  ‐0.47  ‐0.13  ‐4.47
RoSACU ‐4.43  ‐2.25  ‐2.02  ‐0.11  ‐0.02  ‐4.44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 5: Impact of China Recession on Real Absorption by DC Region 
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6. Sensitivity Analysis 
6.1 Overview 
This section examines the sensitivity of the simulation results to variations in the 
assumptions about: (1) factor market flexibility, (2) elasticities of substitution between 
goods of different origin in demand (trade elasticities), (3) elasticities of substitution 
between primary factors in production (factor elasticities), and (4) size of the impacts on 
fuel prices. We discuss the results in detail below, but can summarize the major findings.  
 
In general, in the short run, factor markets do not adjust quickly—factors are immobile—
and it is not easy to substitute among sources of supply of imports and destinations of 
exports. We capture these rigidities by specifying low trade elasticities, factor 
immobility, and low factor substitution elasticities. The results indicate that, when 
quantities are unable to adjust, price adjustments are more extreme and the welfare losses 
arising from adverse shocks are worse, especially when there is unemployment. The 
easier it is for demanders to adjust consumption patterns and producers to adjust factor 
utilization and supply, the more the economy is able to adjust to the shock with moderate 
welfare losses (section 6.2).  
 
The specification of a cut in GDP in the OECD+ economies leads to a decrease in the 
price of fuels and other primary commodities. As noted above, the model does not 
capture speculative forces or price bubbles. The projected fall in the world prices of these 
commodities in the recession scenarios is not as great as has occurred over the past few 
months, which is a reflection of the model’s market equilibrium specification. To explore 
the impact of a more extreme drop in the world prices of primary commodities, we 
specified a scenario where primary commodity markets are assumed to be highly 
distorted, with price wedges that may reflect restricted supply due to monopoly behaviour 
or speculative forces. When we remove the distortions, supply increases and the world 
price falls by far more than in the recession scenario alone. The result is that net primary 
commodity importers gain much more than in the recession only scenarios, while the real 
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welfare losses for fuel exporting developing countries are magnified. The result is that a 
number of very fuel-import dependent countries gain more from the drop in world prices 
than they lose from the adverse impact on their export markets—they are net gainers in 
these scenarios (section 6.3).  
6.2 Sensitivity to Factor Market Closures and Elasticities 
Table 11 provides an overview of the alternative factor market closures and elasticity 
configurations considered here. The main scenario presented in sections 4 and 5 is 
labelled as simulation run R0. This scenario allows for unemployment of skilled and 
unskilled labour as well as for underutilization of capital in response to adverse demand 
shocks in non-OECD countries by assuming rigid real factor prices, while these factors 
are mobile across sectors: fixed wages and unemployment (UEM closure). Natural 
resources, which enter the production of value added in the Agfood, Fuels and Other 
Primary sectors only, and land, which is only used in Agfood, are treated as sector-
specific factors, i.e. these factors are immobile across sectors. The supply of these factors 
is inelastic and sector-specific factor prices adjust flexibly to exogenous shocks: full 
employment but sectorally immobile factors (FES closure). For natural resources and 
land, the FES closure is maintained across all sensitivity simulations considered here.  
Simulation runs R1 and R2 extend the FES closure to capital markets and then to labour 
markets. Note that closure configuration R2 treats all primary factors as sector-specific, 
and hence effectively freezes the factor allocation and production in non-OECD regions 
at initial levels. As shown in Table 12, real absorption losses are significantly stronger 
under the UEM closure, while average world market prices for all goods except Agfood 
drop more pronouncedly under the FES closure (Table 13).18 This is particularly the case 
for fuels and other primary commodities, and therefore the net fuel exporters experience 
stronger adverse terms-of-trade shocks under scenario R2 compared to R0 (Table 14). 
However, the assumption under scenario R2 that all factors remain fully employed in 
developing countries after the crisis shock certainly stretches the imagination, and we 
                                                 
18 Note that the income elasticity of household demand for Agfood is significantly lower than for the other 
commodity groups, and hence the adverse demand shock due the OECD recession is less pronounced in the 
Agfood sector than in other sectors. 
30 
 
consider the factor market closure employed in the main scenario to be more appropriate 
in the present context. 
  
Table 11: Alternative Closures and Elasticity Configurations 
 
   Factor Market Closure  Elasticity Scalar 
   Capital  Labour  Trade  Factors 
R0  UEM  UEM  1 1
R1  FES  UEM  1 1
R2  FES  FES  1 1
R3  FES  UEM  4 3
R4  FES  UEM  2 3
R5  FES  UEM  1 3
R6  FES  UEM  1 1
 
R0: Main Scenario; R1 to R5: Alternative Scenarios.  
UEM: Unemployment with intersectoral factor mobility. Real factor price is fixed relative to CPI. 
FES: Full employment with sector-specificity. Factor price is flexible and sector-specific. Note: Land and NatRes are 
sector-specific in all scenarios.  
Elasticity scalar: Proportional scaling factor for elasticities of substitution between goods of different origin and 
elasticities of substitution between primary factors of production. 
 
 
Turning to sensitivity with respect to elasticities, a comparison of simulation runs R1 and 
R4 illustrates the implications of different assumptions about substitutability among 
factors of production. In the main scenario, R0, and in R1, the sectoral factor elasticities 
are set to 1/3 of the elasticities from the GTAP behavioural database in order to reflect 
the short-run nature of the analysis. The elasticity figures are reported in Appendix Table 
A2. 
In R4, the factor elasticity figures are tripled and thus correspond with the parameter 
settings usually employed in the GTAP model for long-run trade policy analysis. 
Although in these two scenarios factor substitutability is also severely constrained by the 
factor market closure assumptions—so that in fact only skilled and unskilled employment 
can adapt within and across sectors—the comparison clearly indicates, that lower factor 
elasticities raise the welfare losses in terms of real absorption for developing countries 
across the board, while the reductions in world market prices are stronger and the terms 
of trade deteriorate more severely for all developing countries. 
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A comparison of R3 with R4 and R5 illustrates the sensitivity of results to variations in 
the trade elasticity settings. In the main scenarios and in R3, the elasticities of substitution 
between domestic goods and imports as well as the elasticities of substitution between 
imports of different origin are set to ½ of the corresponding GTAP behavioural 
parameters, again in line with the short-run horizon of the analysis. In R4 these 
elasticities are ceteris paribus doubled vis-a-vis R3 and doubled again when we move to 
R5. As shown in Table 13, the world market price reductions for all commodities are 
stronger, the lower the trade elasticities. The comparison of R3 with R4 suggests stronger 
terms of trade deteriorations and stronger welfare losses for all developing countries 
under a proportional reduction of all trade elasticities. However, when trade elasticities 
are scaled down further as we turn from R4 to R5, we observe some interesting 
nonlinearities or “U turns” for a subset of countries; i.e., the terms of trade loss and/or the 
real absorption loss becomes slightly smaller for a minority of countries.19  
 
 
                                                 
19 To understand these U turns in the relationship between the terms of trade effect and trade elasticities,  
note that the overall terms of trade of each developing country can be analytically decomposed into an 
import-weighted  average of its terms of trade with OECD partners and its terms of trade with non-OECD 
partners. While the former unequivocally deteriorate for all developing countries due to the OECD 
recession shock (whereby the deterioration is the stronger, the lower the trade elasticities), the sign of the 
effect on the terms of trade with other non-OECD regions is theoretically indeterminate, since the world 
market prices of non-OECD exports in the numerator and the world market prices of non-OECD imports in 
the denominator both decline simultaneously (whereby the size of the price effects in numerator and 
denominator are the larger, the lower the trade elasticities). Obviously, the sign of the non-OECD terms of 
trade effect must be positive for some countries and negative for others (since it is logically impossible that 
the non-OECD terms of trade of all non-OECD countries deteriorate against each other), depending on the 
initial commodity and geographic composition of a country’s non-OECD imports and exports. Thus, for a 
sub-set of countries the OECD and non-OECD terms of trade effects drag in opposite directions. While the 
former effect dominates in all cases, it is evident that for some fuel-importing countries with relatively low 
OECD shares in total imports (Bangla Desh, Pakistan, Senegal and Ethiopia), the influence of an 
improvement in their terms of trade against other non-OECD countries becomes stronger under very low 
trade elasticities (R5) relative to the OECD terms of trade deterioration effect, so that the overall terms of 
trade deterioration is lower than under R4. 
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Table 12:  Sensitivity Analysis: Real Absorption 
 
Percentage changes 
 
   R0  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
Cambodia -2.98 -2.23 -2.25 -0.80 -1.24 -1.81 
Vietnam -2.49 -1.80 -1.50 -0.73 -1.19 -1.33 
Myanmar -0.89 -0.55 -0.82 0.07 -0.16 -0.29 
Indonesia -1.78 -0.96 -0.90 -0.23 -0.51 -0.77 
Bangladesh -0.52 -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.14 -0.06 
India -0.15 0.01 0.08 0.26 0.14 0.19 
Pakistan -0.31 0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.14 
China -1.84 -1.11 -0.86 -0.25 -0.49 -0.65 
KyrgyzRepub -0.33 0.09 0.11 0.29 0.17 0.38 
RoSoAsia -0.36 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 
RoAsia -3.43 -2.21 -2.08 -0.58 -1.17 -1.76 
RoAmericas -1.95 -0.83 -0.76 -0.13 -0.45 -0.82 
NorthAfrica -3.20 -2.19 -2.21 -0.91 -1.36 -2.05 
Nigeria -4.81 -4.57 -5.35 -2.13 -2.76 -4.38 
Senegal -0.93 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.16 0.13 
RoWAfrica -1.70 -0.82 -0.75 -0.26 -0.53 -0.50 
CntrlAfrica -3.37 -2.68 -2.93 -1.04 -1.54 -2.68 
SCntrlAfrica -4.28 -3.81 -3.81 -1.79 -2.37 -3.43 
Ethiopia -0.67 -0.10 0.08 0.05 -0.10 0.15 
Malawi -1.18 -0.45 -0.24 -0.25 -0.43 -0.34 
Mozambique -1.11 -0.31 -0.26 -0.07 -0.23 -0.23 
Tanzania -0.67 -0.13 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 
Uganda -1.31 -0.79 -0.75 -0.32 -0.50 -0.71 
Zambia -0.95 -0.21 -0.17 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 
Zimbabwe -1.44 -0.32 -0.44 0.05 -0.21 -0.32 
RoEAfrica -1.52 -0.84 -0.77 -0.31 -0.55 -0.72 
SouthAfrica -2.28 -0.79 -0.78 -0.11 -0.42 -0.67 
RoSACU -2.93 -1.77 -2.43 -0.37 -0.86 -1.63 
Simulation: oecdall 
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Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis: World Market Prices 
Percentage changes 
   R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
cAgFood ‐1.6  ‐1.1  0.1  0.1  ‐0.3  ‐1.0  ‐6.8 
cFuels ‐6.2  ‐8.8  ‐11.0  ‐3.3  ‐4.3  ‐5.7  ‐26.7 
cOPrimary ‐2.8  ‐4.3  ‐10.4  ‐0.3  ‐1.0  ‐2.0  ‐11.5 
cNfManuf ‐1.3  ‐1.7  ‐2.2  ‐0.2  ‐0.5  ‐1.0  ‐2.1 
cServices ‐0.5  ‐1.5  ‐3.2  ‐0.1  ‐0.2  ‐0.8  ‐1.9 
Simulation: oecdall 
Note: All price changes are relative to the CPI for OECD America, and must not be misinterpreted as 
absolute $ price changes. 
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Table 14: Sensitivity Analysis: Terms of Trade 
Percentage Changes 
   R0  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
Cambodia -1.31 -1.26 -1.12 -0.40 -0.68 -0.93 
Vietnam -1.50 -2.13 -2.28 -0.65 -1.01 -1.21 
Myanmar -2.18 -2.06 -2.67 -0.67 -1.10 -1.56 
Indonesia -2.11 -2.22 -2.02 -0.67 -1.19 -1.61 
Bangladesh -1.06 -0.99 -0.93 -0.22 -0.51 -0.46 
India -1.61 -1.04 -0.71 -0.08 -0.52 -0.55 
Pakistan -1.42 -1.32 -1.29 -0.15 -0.55 -0.45 
China -1.69 -1.92 -1.53 -0.45 -0.91 -1.15 
KyrgyzRepub -0.79 -1.14 -1.69 0.10 -0.18 -0.22 
RoSoAsia -1.59 -1.86 -2.21 -0.48 -0.86 -0.90 
RoAsia -1.14 -1.62 -1.45 -0.39 -0.74 -1.02 
RoAmericas -1.76 -2.22 -2.25 -0.67 -1.16 -1.64 
NorthAfrica -2.55 -3.94 -4.60 -1.67 -2.24 -3.00 
Nigeria -2.21 -2.56 -2.79 -2.18 -2.35 -3.55 
Senegal -1.23 -1.56 -1.49 -0.20 -0.65 -0.60 
RoWAfrica -1.80 -2.64 -2.91 -0.65 -1.20 -1.46 
CntrlAfrica -2.84 -3.76 -4.31 -2.00 -2.52 -3.66 
SCntrlAfrica -3.88 -5.13 -6.07 -2.69 -3.23 -4.19 
Ethiopia -1.68 -1.88 -1.98 -0.22 -0.75 -0.68 
Malawi -1.79 -2.00 -1.95 -0.71 -1.07 -1.26 
Mozambique -0.90 -1.02 -1.13 -0.20 -0.47 -0.54 
Tanzania -1.48 -1.41 -1.58 -0.16 -0.59 -0.62 
Uganda -2.54 -3.06 -3.33 -1.17 -1.66 -2.19 
Zambia -0.91 -0.47 -0.36 -0.02 -0.24 -0.30 
Zimbabwe -0.67 -0.45 -0.68 -0.02 -0.22 -0.33 
RoEAfrica -2.09 -2.75 -3.21 -0.94 -1.41 -1.80 
SouthAfrica -1.32 -2.03 -2.19 -0.48 -0.96 -1.31 
RoSACU -0.99 -1.79 -2.59 -0.48 -0.95 -1.40 
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Table 15: Impact of OECD+ Recession on DC Real Macro Aggregates for R2 
Percentage Changes 
   Absorption Imports Exports Exports Terms of GDP 
   real Volume Volume Value Trade real 
Cambodia ‐2.25  ‐2.02  0.27  ‐3.83  ‐1.12  0.00 
Vietnam ‐1.50  ‐1.78  ‐0.08  ‐5.04  ‐2.28  ‐0.07 
Myanmar ‐0.82  ‐1.81  0.32  ‐6.21  ‐2.67  ‐0.15 
Indonesia ‐0.90  ‐2.70  ‐0.02  ‐5.37  ‐2.02  0.01 
Bangladesh ‐0.06  ‐0.57  ‐0.50  ‐4.06  ‐0.93  ‐0.01 
India 0.08  ‐0.36  ‐0.66  ‐5.00  ‐0.71  0.01 
Pakistan 0.06  ‐0.38  ‐1.03  ‐4.70  ‐1.29  0.00 
China ‐0.86  ‐2.45  ‐0.30  ‐4.27  ‐1.53  0.10 
KyrgyzRepub 0.11  ‐0.43  ‐0.98  ‐6.68  ‐1.69  ‐0.05 
RoSoAsia 0.07  ‐0.15  ‐0.64  ‐5.46  ‐2.21  0.01 
RoAsia ‐2.08  ‐2.31  0.09  ‐4.09  ‐1.45  ‐0.10 
RoAmericas ‐0.76  ‐2.78  0.35  ‐5.09  ‐2.25  ‐0.02 
NorthAfrica ‐2.21  ‐4.49  0.90  ‐7.53  ‐4.60  ‐0.06 
Nigeria ‐5.35  ‐9.04  1.09  ‐11.10  ‐2.79  0.03 
Senegal 0.10  ‐0.14  ‐0.81  ‐4.01  ‐1.49  0.00 
RoWAfrica ‐0.75  ‐1.44  ‐0.17  ‐4.81  ‐2.91  0.00 
CntrlAfrica ‐2.93  ‐7.09  1.55  ‐9.67  ‐4.31  0.17 
SCntrlAfrica ‐3.81  ‐6.05  0.29  ‐11.54  ‐6.07  0.04 
Ethiopia 0.08  ‐0.24  ‐1.03  ‐4.95  ‐1.98  0.00 
Malawi ‐0.24  ‐0.42  0.00  ‐4.47  ‐1.95  0.00 
Mozambique ‐0.26  ‐0.81  ‐0.14  ‐4.46  ‐1.13  0.00 
Tanzania ‐0.02  ‐0.37  ‐0.55  ‐4.50  ‐1.58  ‐0.03 
Uganda ‐0.75  ‐1.96  0.69  ‐6.18  ‐3.33  0.00 
Zambia ‐0.17  ‐0.49  ‐0.10  ‐3.90  ‐0.36  ‐0.14 
Zimbabwe ‐0.44  ‐0.63  0.06  ‐4.34  ‐0.68  ‐0.06 
RoEAfrica ‐0.77  ‐1.87  0.16  ‐5.87  ‐3.21  ‐0.07 
SouthAfrica ‐0.78  ‐2.60  0.09  ‐5.57  ‐2.19  ‐0.02 
RoSACU ‐2.43  ‐3.02  0.88  ‐7.38  ‐2.59  ‐0.02 
OECDAsia ‐4.80  ‐3.90  ‐4.74  ‐6.76  2.04  ‐5.00 
OECDAmerica ‐4.61  ‐3.08  ‐5.64  ‐7.51  0.59  ‐5.04 
OECDEurope ‐4.71  ‐4.31  ‐5.03  ‐7.44  0.69  ‐4.99 
RoW ‐2.58  ‐4.98  0.86  ‐8.49  ‐4.07  ‐0.13 
Simulation: oecdall: All factors sector-specific 
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Table 16: Impact of OECD+ Recession on DC Real Macro Aggregates for R4 
Percentage Changes 
  
Absorption Imports Exports Exports Terms of GDP 
  
real Volume Volume Value Trade real 
Cambodia ‐1.24  ‐1.47  ‐0.31  ‐1.51  ‐0.68  ‐0.15 
Vietnam ‐1.19  ‐1.72  ‐1.01  ‐2.58  ‐1.01  ‐0.51 
Myanmar ‐0.16  ‐0.81  0.14  ‐1.69  ‐1.10  0.12 
Indonesia ‐0.51  ‐1.77  ‐0.32  ‐2.02  ‐1.19  ‐0.03 
Bangladesh ‐0.14  ‐0.69  ‐0.57  ‐1.71  ‐0.51  ‐0.07 
India 0.14  ‐0.39  ‐0.19  ‐1.41  ‐0.52  0.19 
Pakistan ‐0.01  ‐0.53  ‐0.75  ‐1.83  ‐0.55  0.02 
China ‐0.49  ‐1.82  ‐0.64  ‐1.78  ‐0.91  ‐0.04 
KyrgyzRepub 0.17  0.08  ‐0.18  ‐1.37  ‐0.18  0.03 
RoSoAsia ‐0.07  ‐0.31  ‐0.40  ‐1.89  ‐0.86  ‐0.03 
RoAsia ‐1.17  ‐1.67  ‐0.54  ‐1.69  ‐0.74  ‐0.28 
RoAmericas ‐0.45  ‐1.75  ‐0.27  ‐1.83  ‐1.16  ‐0.10 
NorthAfrica ‐1.36  ‐2.64  ‐0.13  ‐2.83  ‐2.24  ‐0.36 
Nigeria ‐2.76  ‐4.69  0.22  ‐3.71  ‐2.35  ‐0.23 
Senegal ‐0.16  ‐0.40  ‐0.58  ‐1.56  ‐0.65  ‐0.11 
RoWAfrica ‐0.53  ‐1.13  ‐0.63  ‐2.03  ‐1.20  ‐0.14 
CntrlAfrica ‐1.54  ‐3.84  0.16  ‐3.13  ‐2.52  ‐0.30 
SCntrlAfrica ‐2.37  ‐3.48  ‐0.19  ‐4.08  ‐3.23  ‐0.48 
Ethiopia ‐0.10  ‐0.46  ‐0.81  ‐1.94  ‐0.75  ‐0.07 
Malawi ‐0.43  ‐0.74  ‐0.37  ‐2.05  ‐1.07  ‐0.16 
Mozambique ‐0.23  ‐0.78  ‐0.50  ‐1.63  ‐0.47  ‐0.10 
Tanzania ‐0.11  ‐0.47  ‐0.53  ‐1.58  ‐0.59  ‐0.06 
Uganda ‐0.50  ‐1.41  ‐0.03  ‐2.41  ‐1.66  ‐0.10 
Zambia ‐0.04  ‐0.28  ‐0.05  ‐0.99  ‐0.24  ‐0.03 
Zimbabwe ‐0.21  ‐0.36  ‐0.14  ‐1.20  ‐0.22  ‐0.07 
RoEAfrica ‐0.55  ‐1.29  ‐0.39  ‐2.32  ‐1.41  ‐0.22 
SouthAfrica ‐0.42  ‐1.56  ‐0.44  ‐1.92  ‐0.96  ‐0.09 
RoSACU ‐0.86  ‐1.01  0.24  ‐1.62  ‐0.95  ‐0.09 
Simulation: oecdall 
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6.3 Simulation of Stronger Primary Commodity Price Effects 
Scenario R6 combines the OECD+ recession shock with significantly stronger world 
market price reductions for fuels and other primary commodities than in scenarios R0 to 
R5. These stronger price effects are generated in an ad hoc manner by imposing initial 
wedges or mark-ups between price and marginal costs for fuels, agricultural and other 
primary commodities produced in the OECD and RoW regions, which are then 
eliminated in the crisis simulation. As shown in Table 13, in this scenario the average 
world market price for fuels drops by 27 percent relative to the numeraire, while the 
world market prices for other primary commodities and agfood products fall by 12 
percent and 7 percent respectively.20  The factor market closure assumptions and 
elasticity settings for this scenario are the same as for R1. 
Table 17 reports the simulated impacts on the main macro aggregates for developing 
countries while Figure 6 shows the ranking by size of the real absorption effects. This 
scenario magnifies the welfare losses in particular for the African net fuel exporters. On 
the other hand, for 12 of the net importers of fuels and other primary commodities, the 
gains from lower import prices are sufficiently strong to generate a positive net welfare 
gain in this illustrative scenario. 
                                                 
20 The assumed initial mark-ups are 20% for fuels, 12% for Oprimary and 5% for Agfood. 
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Table 17: Impact of OECD+ Recession on DC Real Macro Aggregates for R6 
Percentage Changes 
  Absorption Imports Exports Exports Terms of GDP 
  real Volume Volume Value Trade real 
Cambodia ‐2.16  ‐1.22  1.07  ‐2.29  ‐1.41  0.13 
Vietnam ‐1.96  ‐1.62  1.40  ‐3.02  ‐4.38  0.47 
Myanmar 0.02  ‐0.90  3.71  ‐4.61  ‐6.17  0.77 
Indonesia ‐0.94  ‐2.34  1.75  ‐4.09  ‐3.75  0.52 
Bangladesh 0.87  1.43  0.00  1.43  0.28  0.47 
India 1.79  2.91  ‐0.18  3.08  1.05  1.05 
Pakistan 1.51  1.70  ‐1.45  3.14  0.25  0.87 
China ‐0.40  ‐1.58  0.49  ‐2.07  ‐1.84  0.43 
KyrgyzRepub 1.45  0.74  ‐1.88  2.63  ‐1.46  0.19 
RoSoAsia 1.36  1.83  0.05  1.78  ‐2.05  0.78 
RoAsia ‐1.52  ‐1.30  1.09  ‐2.39  ‐1.69  0.24 
RoAmericas ‐1.07  ‐3.92  1.44  ‐5.36  ‐4.21  0.21 
NorthAfrica ‐4.61  ‐7.77  2.48  ‐10.25  ‐8.97  ‐0.56 
Nigeria ‐12.00  ‐19.25  2.30  ‐21.55  ‐6.94  ‐0.95 
Senegal 1.34  1.61  ‐1.56  3.17  ‐0.79  0.40 
RoWAfrica ‐1.22  ‐2.20  ‐0.37  ‐1.83  ‐5.23  ‐0.12 
CntrlAfrica ‐6.74  ‐14.11  3.27  ‐17.38  ‐9.44  ‐0.82 
SCntrlAfrica ‐10.79  ‐14.18  0.75  ‐14.93  ‐14.46  ‐2.18 
Ethiopia 1.45  1.85  ‐1.27  3.12  ‐1.19  0.46 
Malawi ‐1.58  ‐2.35  ‐0.08  ‐2.27  ‐6.47  ‐0.29 
Mozambique 0.78  0.71  ‐0.07  0.77  0.06  0.39 
Tanzania 0.52  0.68  ‐1.11  1.79  ‐1.14  0.09 
Uganda ‐2.17  ‐4.76  1.89  ‐6.65  ‐8.33  ‐0.33 
Zambia 0.71  0.82  0.23  0.59  0.39  ‐0.06 
Zimbabwe 0.44  0.26  0.39  ‐0.14  ‐0.27  0.51 
RoEAfrica ‐1.58  ‐3.29  0.84  ‐4.13  ‐6.80  ‐0.31 
SouthAfrica ‐0.44  ‐2.22  0.75  ‐2.98  ‐2.64  0.42 
RoSACU ‐2.86  ‐2.52  2.28  ‐4.80  ‐3.44  0.19 
Simulation: oecdall 
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Figure 6: Change in Real Absorption by Country - Scenario R6 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The simulation analysis presented in this study suggests that the impacts of the global 
financial crisis on developing countries through the channel of changes in international 
trade differ widely in magnitude across country groups. The main determinants of the 
size of aggregate welfare losses due to adverse terms-of-trade effects triggered by a 
recession in high income countries are the commodity composition of exports and the 
degree of openness to international trade. The highest percentage reductions in final 
domestic absorption are suffered by net fuel exporters in sub-Saharan Africa with an 
undiversified export structure in which fuels are the dominant source of export revenue. 
Among country groups with a similar export diversification structure, those with a higher 
ratio of exports to GDP and a higher share of OECD exports in total exports of good and 
services experience higher aggregate welfare losses. The elasticity of real absorption with 
respect to one percentage-point drop in OECD real GDP ranges from -0.1 for net 
importers of fuels and other primary commodities with low OECD export-to-GDP ratios 
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to nearly -1 for Nigeria. While the precise magnitudes of the simulated effects are 
inevitably subject to of uncertainty, the aforementioned qualitative results and the 
associated relative ranking of developing countries in terms of their exposure to trade-
related crisis impacts are quite robust to variations in the assumptions about factor market 
rigidities and behavioural parameters,  
An approximate calculation of the absolute value of the annual welfare reduction due to 
adverse crisis-related trade effects for the least developed countries suggests that the 
additional external assistance that would be required to compensate these very poor 
countries for the purely trade-related economic losses due to the shock inflicted on them 
by the “North” are relatively small, roughly ten billion US$, and are certainly tiny 
relative to the magnitudes of the costs of bail-out and domestic economic stimulation 
packages currently being implemented in the major OECD economies.  
However, to keep a proper perspective on these results, it must be borne in mind that this 
study focuses only on impacts through changes in real trade flows due to changes in 
relative prices triggered by the recession in high-income countries and is not designed to 
provide a comprehensive quantification of all global financial crisis impacts on 
developing countries. In particular, the analysis excludes other potentially important 
monetary transmission channels such as a contraction of trade credit, drops in 
remittances, changes in foreign debt servicing burdens and reductions or reversals of 
foreign investment inflows.  
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Appendix 
A. Behavioural Elasticity Parameters 
Tables A.1 and A.2 report the trade elasticities used in the main scenarios. The elasticities 
of substitution between imports by origin in Table A.2 are aggregated from the GTAP 
behavioural parameter database (Dimaran, McDougall and Hertel, 2006) after re-scaling 
by a factor 0.5 to reflect the short-run nature of the present analysis. The elasticities in 
this database are based on an econometric study by Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic and Keeney 
(2007) and distinguish 57 commodity groups. In the same database, the Armington 
elasticities of substitution between domestic commodities and aggregate imports are 
determined by the so-called  “rule of two”, i.e. the Armington elasticities are assumed to 
be half as large as the elasticities of substitution between imports by origin. Some 
empirical support for this ad-hoc rule is provided by Liu, Arndt and Hertel (2004). The 
elasticities for the 57 GTAP sectors are aggregated to the 5 sectors of the present model 
using each destination region’s sub-sectoral benchmark gross absorption shares and sub-
sectoral import shares as weights. The sectoral factor substitution elasticities reported in 
Table 3 are likewise re-scaled aggregations of the corresponding GTAP database 
parameters using region-specific sectoral value added shares. Section 6 reports sensitivity 
analyses for alternative elasticity configurations. 
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Table A.1: Elasticity of Substitution between Domestic Goods and Imports: 
                   Main Scenarios 
 
cAgFood  cFuels  cOPrimary  cNfManuf cServices 
OECDAsia  1.14  1.80  0.62  1.78  0.97 
Cambodia  1.18  1.97  1.02  1.80  0.98 
Vietnam  1.42  1.17  1.05  1.82  1.03 
Myanmar  1.42  1.81  0.91  1.84  1.03 
Indonesia  1.23  1.94  0.69  1.79  0.97 
Bangladesh  1.44  3.84  1.13  1.83  0.98 
India  1.35  1.77  0.78  1.80  1.00 
Pakistan  1.43  1.73  0.78  1.80  1.01 
China  1.04  1.58  0.76  1.82  0.98 
KyrgyzRepub  1.27  3.38  0.53  1.81  1.15 
RoSoAsia  1.42  1.10  1.11  1.79  0.98 
RoAsia  1.22  2.28  0.57  1.86  0.98 
OECDAmerica  1.21  2.02  0.79  1.79  0.97 
RoAmericas  1.27  1.81  0.66  1.78  0.98 
OECDEurope  1.19  1.82  0.70  1.78  0.96 
NorthAfrica  1.32  2.81  0.48  1.78  0.98 
Nigeria  1.04  2.24  0.89  1.80  0.98 
Senegal  1.18  1.51  0.77  1.75  0.97 
RoWAfrica  1.07  1.68  0.90  1.84  0.97 
CntrlAfrica  1.22  1.54  1.02  1.78  0.96 
SCntrlAfrica  1.16  1.44  1.10  1.85  0.97 
Ethiopia  1.10  1.05  1.10  1.83  0.97 
Malawi  1.08  1.14  0.99  1.73  0.97 
Mozambique  1.18  1.05  1.05  1.76  0.99 
Tanzania  1.15  1.11  0.92  1.78  0.97 
Uganda  1.03  1.17  1.07  1.77  0.96 
Zambia  1.20  1.46  0.85  1.78  1.00 
Zimbabwe  1.15  1.15  0.48  1.77  1.05 
RoEAfrica  1.21  1.53  1.09  1.77  0.97 
SouthAfrica  1.15  1.67  0.94  1.73  0.97 
RoSACU  1.19  1.09  0.90  1.74  0.96 
RoW  1.35  3.08  0.67  1.78  1.02 
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Table A.2: Elasticity of Substitution between Imports by Origin: 
        Main Scenarios  
 
   cAgFood  cFuels  cOPrimary  cNfManuf  cServices
OECDAsia  2.48  5.75 1.12 3.79 1.90
Cambodia  1.80  4.29 1.07 3.63 1.92
Vietnam  2.40  2.10 1.68 3.66 1.90
Myanmar  2.63  2.10 0.99 3.64 1.90
Indonesia  2.76  3.26 1.06 3.67 1.90
Bangladesh  2.79  3.04 1.45 3.68 1.90
India  2.78  4.82 1.02 3.81 1.90
Pakistan  2.95  3.73 1.32 3.65 1.90
China  2.68  4.24 1.12 3.85 1.90
KyrgyzRepub  2.34  7.38 0.94 3.62 1.91
RoSoAsia  2.45  2.13 1.07 3.56 1.92
RoAsia  2.42  4.58 0.98 3.81 1.91
OECDAmerica  2.27  5.49 1.09 3.65 1.91
RoAmericas  2.62  4.37 0.97 3.65 1.94
OECDEurope  2.44  6.12 1.10 3.61 1.92
NorthAfrica  2.99  3.96 1.04 3.60 1.91
Nigeria  2.76  2.10 1.05 3.70 1.90
Senegal  2.73  3.91 0.97 3.53 1.90
RoWAfrica  2.66  2.96 1.00 3.71 1.93
CntrlAfrica  2.67  2.16 1.23 3.64 1.91
SCntrlAfrica  2.43  2.12 0.99 3.82 1.90
Ethiopia  2.96  2.10 1.17 3.69 1.90
Malawi  2.72  2.11 0.96 3.49 1.91
Mozambique  2.83  2.10 1.18 3.56 2.14
Tanzania  2.99  2.10 1.12 3.62 1.91
Uganda  2.84  2.12 0.92 3.56 1.91
Zambia  2.53  4.50 0.93 3.59 1.90
Zimbabwe  2.47  2.11 0.95 3.66 2.23
RoEAfrica  2.73  2.64 1.36 3.57 1.91
SouthAfrica  2.66  4.96 0.95 3.59 1.97
RoSACU  2.32  2.11 1.11 3.52 1.95
RoW  2.57  9.24 0.97 3.61 1.96
 
 
44 
 
Table A.3: Elasticities of Substitution between Primary Factors: 
        Main Scenarios 
 
   aAgFood  aFuels  aOPrimary aNfManuf aServices
OECDAsia  0.25  0.17 0.10 0.42 0.46
Cambodia  0.10  0.11 0.10 0.42 0.49
Vietnam  0.16  0.08 0.10 0.42 0.45
Myanmar  0.08  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.45
Indonesia  0.17  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.47
Bangladesh  0.14  0.09 0.10 0.42 0.51
India  0.16  0.11 0.10 0.42 0.48
Pakistan  0.13  0.12 0.10 0.42 0.48
China  0.13  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
KyrgyzRepub  0.10  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.45
RoSoAsia  0.14  0.07 0.10 0.42 0.50
RoAsia  0.17  0.08 0.10 0.42 0.47
OECDAmerica  0.26  0.09 0.10 0.42 0.45
RoAmericas  0.18  0.12 0.10 0.42 0.46
OECDEurope  0.25  0.11 0.10 0.42 0.46
NorthAfrica  0.16  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
Nigeria  0.09  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
Senegal  0.16  0.41 0.10 0.42 0.47
RoWAfrica  0.10  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.49
CntrlAfrica  0.15  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.49
SCntrlAfrica  0.15  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
Ethiopia  0.10  0.38 0.10 0.42 0.47
Malawi  0.14  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.50
Mozambique  0.11  0.28 0.10 0.42 0.50
Tanzania  0.13  0.12 0.10 0.42 0.50
Uganda  0.09  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.49
Zambia  0.14  0.33 0.10 0.42 0.48
Zimbabwe  0.20  0.13 0.10 0.42 0.45
RoEAfrica  0.15  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
SouthAfrica  0.24  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.45
RoSACU  0.23  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.46
RoW  0.16  0.10 0.10 0.42 0.48
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